The Room Where It Happened, Chapter 4

Chapter 4: "The Singapore Sling" or "Maybe Having An Ill-Informed Narcissist As President Is Bad For US Foreign Relations"

Note: before getting into this, it seems timely for this discussion that President Trump's ability to "read" has been touted by the press secretary, who has also argued that Trump is the most informed person on the planet; many officials in a place to comment on this have pushed back against this notion, and the details presented by Bolton in this chapter also question Trump's commitment to knowledge.

Quick Hits: this chapter quickly pivots from Bolton's joy at the end of the Iran Nuclear Deal to his disgust at the events leading up to the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore. Here he paints a picture of Trump as unprepared and willfully ignorant of history and general points of foreign policy, as a man driven not by deeply-held beliefs, but by personal image and feelings, a man consumed with himself over country.

Critical as I am of John Bolton's worldview and approach to global conflicts in general, I would not fault him in terms of preparation and being a well-read student of history. As such, his general consternation at working with a president who seems to share little or no interest in either. However, before he gets too deep into this obvious, yet troubling critique, he does outline his interactions with the other major allied players in this scene:

a. South Korea: Bolton is quite blunt in his view that the South Korean government's goals do not align with America's goals, and he goes further to portray them as foolish and over-eager in pursuing the "Sunshine Policy" of reunification on the peninsula. In his mind, this makes them a bit gullible and less inclined to take the hard line stances that he sees as the only real solution to this conflict. Of course, relatively-speaking, he would say that at least they have an understanding of the situation, unlike Trump.

b. Japan: Bolton views Japan as an ally, in the traditional sense, of course, but also in terms of applying influence and pressure on the president to not completely give Kim Jong Un everything for free. This makes sense, given the fact that North Korea has tested missiles over Japan, and they certainly possess weapons capable of damaging them in a more real and immediate way than attacking the US directly.

While discussions of normal international relations are of interest to me, I feel like most of you would probably find Bolton's increasingly varied criticisms of Trump a better use of our time. So, let's just move right on into those. First up on the docket in this category is the president's legendarily childish pettiness, in which personal slights and grudges are allowed the seriously negatively impact important decisions on up to the global scale. Obviously, Trump's disdain for actual American hero John McCain is quite well-known; in this chapter, Bolton talks about his own anger over Trump's rewarding instead of punishing staffer Kelly Sadler after her outrageous statement about McCain's vote on Gina Haspel's CIA director nomination not mattering because he was about to die. This lead to a discussion about apology with then chief of staff Gen. Kelly, who gives Bolton his frank assessment: "'you can't imagine how desperate I am to get out of here. This is a bad place to work, as you will find out'" (Bolton 86). Norm-breaking, spiteful, vindictive pettiness, and a hostile work environment are hallmarks of this White House. This is seen again later with Trump's disastrous performance in the G7 in Canada.

Another issue here is the twin shortcomings of Trump's vanity and his lack of knowledge of how government and diplomacy function.  Case in point here is the aforementioned G7 conference; while Bolton himself is clearly disdainful of this sort of proceeding on principal, he is frustrated at Trump's approach to it. Instead of letting the diplomats settle things, "[Trump] concluded, however, since he was a 'closer,' he and the other leaders would gather in one of the lounges and negotiate themselves" (Bolton 103). This is yet further evidence of Trump's believe that only he can fix everything, this drive to prove that he is the best at everything instead of trusting in the professionals he already has on staff.

Trump's narcissism is definitely in Bolton's crosshairs throughout the chapter. As the National Security Advisor, he is justifiably concerned about this, because it leads to Trump frequently giving in to the strongmen that he likes (Putin, Xi, Kim, etc.) often at the expense of America's closest allies. This tendency also infuriates other intelligence and military officials (such as Gen. Mattis) as these decisions weaken US military readiness and severely weaken any projection of strength and resolve in key regions. This is exemplified in Trump's desperation to go through with the Singapore talks, despite their obvious futility and his own advisors' strenuous objections (even the vice president). Bolton goes into some detail on the president's pathetic reaction to Kim's "love letters" and how this helped influence Trump's shallow thinking on the matter.